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The Commodity Nature of Labor-Power
GUIDO STAROSTA AND GASTÓN CALIGARIS
ABSTRACT: Some recent Marxist contributions, among them the 
so-called New Solution to the “transformation problem,” call into 
question the idea of labor-power as a fully-fledged commodity. Yet, 
the rejection of the commodity nature of labor-power compromises 
Marx’s whole explanation of the origin of surplus-value on the 
basis of the exchange of equivalents. It can be shown, however, 
that it is possible to offer a positive case for the commodity-nature 
of labor-power which is consistent with Marx’s broader dialectical 
investigation of the determinations of the value-form. This requires 
building upon the arguments that Marx explicitly put forward in 
his economic works, but also going beyond them, albeit on the basis 
of those arguments themselves. Furthermore, this novel approach 
that treats the reproduction of labor-power as a commodity deter-
mined by the self-valorization of capital proves to be very valuable 
in shedding light on two classic Marxist controversies, namely: the 
debate on domestic labor and the one on skilled labor.
Introduction
IN A LETTER TO BECKER from April 17, 1867, Marx referred to Capital as “without question the most terrible MISSILE that has yet been hurled at the heads of the bourgeoisie (landowners 
included)” (Marx, 1987a, 358). Unfortunately, in the rest of that brief 
note Marx does not clarify the specific sense in which he considered his 
work to be such a “terrible missile” against the bourgeoisie. However, it 
seems quite safe to assume that his scientific explanation of the source 
of capitalist “profit” in the exploitation of wage-workers was among 
those fundamental aspects of the critique of political economy that he 
had in mind. As is widely known, the key to this explanation resides 
in the discovery of the existence of a commodity “whose use-value 
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possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value” (Marx, 
1976a, 270). This commodity is, of course, labor-power which, “like 
all other commodities, . . . has a value” (Marx, 1976a, 274).
Now, in light of this centrality of the commodity nature of labor-
power for Marx’s critical investigation of the nature of the capital rela-
tion, its rejection can only amount to turning that “terrible missile” 
against Marx himself. In effect, once we reject the commodity nature 
of labor-power, then Marx’s whole explanation of the origin of surplus-
value on the basis of the exchange of equivalents falls down. As Krätke 
comments while revisiting the very early critiques of Marx’s “unsolved 
puzzles” in the theory of wages, the “corollary” of such a rejection of the 
proposition that labor-power is a commodity and has a value “like all 
other commodities” is “clear and devastating” (Krätke, 2009, 166). Yet, 
this objection to the commodity nature of labor-power has resurfaced in 
the last couple of decades. Curiously enough, it has not been advanced 
by Marx’s “detractors” but, as we discuss below, by some of his followers.
A first aim of this article is to critically engage with some of these 
recent Marxist contributions which, whether they see it as a rectifica-
tion or ratification of Marx’s argument in Capital, call into question 
the idea of labor-power as a fully-fledged commodity. This is done in 
the next section, where we review some of the main positions in this 
contemporary debate. In addition, we subsequently offer a positive 
case for the commodity-nature of labor-power that builds upon, but 
also goes beyond, the arguments that Marx explicitly put forward in 
his economic works. Finally, in order to illustrate the usefulness of this 
novel take on the determinations of the commodity labor-power, we 
revisit two classic Marxist controversies that are intimately connected 
with the central subject matter of this paper, namely: the debate on 
domestic labor and the one on skilled labor.
Marxist Controversies over Labor-Power as a Commodity
The objection to the commodity nature of labor-power and, a fortiori, to 
the determination of its value by the socially necessary labor-time required 
for its production, can be traced back to the whole series of critiques of 
Marx that emerged as soon as Volume III of Capital was published.1
1 As argued elsewhere (Kicillof and Starosta, 2007a), in its simplest determination privately 
undertaken labor is socially necessary (hence value-producing) if it satisfies two conditions: 
first, it corresponds to the technologically normal conditions of production prevailing in 
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Thus, already in 1907 Bortkiewicz argued that since there is no 
“competition between producers” of this commodity, wages cannot 
be subordinated to “the general law of value” and therefore its value 
cannot be determined in the same way as the value of other commodi-
ties (Bortkiewicz, 1952, 57). Strictly speaking, this first line of criticism 
mainly and explicitly revolved around the denial of the existence of an 
adjustment process of the price of labor-power to the average socially 
necessary labor-time for the production of this particular commodity. 
However, insofar as in Bortkiewicz’s Ricardian approach there was no 
clear distinction between the price and the value of labor-power, the 
implausibility of such an adjustment mechanism implicitly called into 
question the very foundations of the value-content of labor-power. In 
fact, Bortkiewicz concluded that real wages had to be taken as fixed 
(Bortkiewicz, 1952, 57). According to Krätke, Tugan-Baranowsky went 
even further and argued that “labor power was not a commodity at 
all, wages could not be considered a ‘value phenomenon’ and Marx’s 
theory of wages was outright wrong or just tautological” (Krätke, 2009, 
169). Yet, as Krätke also reports, Marxists at that time did not respond 
to the challenge (Krätke, 2009, 166).
Although similar arguments emerged later in the 20th century, 
and on this occasion among scholars who were otherwise sympathetic 
to Marx’s ideas (e.g., Castoriadis, 1988; Bowles and Gintis, 1981), it has 
been in relatively recent times that the objection cropped up within 
the specialized Marxist literature. Moreover, in many cases the objec-
tion to the commodity nature of labor is not seen just as a correction 
to an allegedly inadequate treatment of the subject by Marx, but is 
even presented as a reflection of Marx’s own views.
This rejection of the commodity nature of labor-power and, 
consequently, of Marx’s account of the determination of its value, 
has come from rather disparate traditions. The so-called systematic 
dialectics strand of value-form theory is a case in point. Thus, Chris 
Arthur takes “distance from Marx’s attempt to treat labor power as a 
produced commodity subject to the law of value” (Arthur, 2006, 90). 
More specifically, he states that “wage-labor should be treated in the 
same way as landed property, namely as a material presupposition of 
society (Marx, 1976a, 129), and, second, it can satisfy a social  need (Marx, 1976a, 131), re-
gardless of whether that need arises from “the stomach or the imagination” (Marx, 1976a, 
125). In other words, only under those two circumstances is the objectification of the abstract 
character of private labor socially represented in the form of value.
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capitalist production, which is rewarded with part of the value created 
in production, namely the wage” (Arthur, 2006, 90; see also Reuten 
and Williams, 1989, 68; and Roblez Baez, 2011, 26–27n).
Still, the most remarkable case is that of the so-called “New 
Solution” or “New Interpretation” to the “transformation problem” 
(Foley, 1982; Lipietz, 1982; Dumenil, 1983). In effect, unlike the 
rather incidental role played by the rejection of labor-power as a 
“genuine commodity” among “new dialecticians,” for these other 
scholars it constitutes one of the pillars on which their whole theo-
retical construction is based. On the other hand, their arguments 
have already been critically examined quite sharply by other Marxist 
scholars (Mavroudeas, 2001; Fine et al., 2002), which provides us with 
a firmer basis to develop our own arguments.
Perhaps the clearest formulation of the New Solution’s corollary 
about the commodity nature of labor-power can be found in the work 
of Simon Mohun. According to this author, labor-power
is not a produced commodity in the same sense [as other commodities]. 
It is a capacity or potentiality of people, and people are not (re)produced 
under capitalist relations of production. No capitalist production process is 
involved, no process of adding value to the means of production by living 
labor; neither do there exist different technologies of production in com-
petition with one another which must be averaged to find a market value. 
(Mohun, 1994, 398.)
For this reason, Mohun continues, Marx’s own definition of the value 
of labor-power is not given in terms of the labor-time required for its 
production but “in terms of the value of the commodities which the 
money-value of labor-power can purchase, or command” (Mohun, 
1994, 398). It is this novel conception of the value of labor-power that 
provides one of the keys to this approach’s specific solution to the 
“transformation problem.” In effect, under this new definition, the 
value of labor-power is determined as the part of total value-added 
represented by the wage share. However, through an idiosyncratic 
formal procedure, they still conclude, in a roundabout way, that the 
money-wage represents a determinate quantity of socially necessary 
abstract labor.
The first step in the New Solution’s construction is to posit an 
“immediate equality between the total price of the net product and 
the total living labor performed in each period” (Mavroudeas, 2001, 
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59). On this basis, these authors subsequently obtain the “monetary 
expression of labor” (MEL) as the ratio between the total price of 
the net product and the total hours worked. The MEL thereby allows 
them to transform money-prices into “labor-values.” In the case of 
labor-power, its “value” expressed in “labor-time” is calculated by mul-
tiplying the rate of money-wages by the MEL. Through this peculiar 
procedure, these scholars consider that they avoid the problem of 
transforming variable capital and, as a consequence, that they offer 
a way to sidetrack the divergence between total profits and total sur-
plus value. However, this “solution” to the “transformation problem” 
comes at the cost of parting company with Marx’s own definition of 
the value of labor-power as determined by “a definite quantity of the 
average social labor objectified in it” (Marx, 1976a, 274). As Foley 
puts it in his seminal contribution to the New Solution, “the value of 
labor power, in this perspective, is the fraction of the total abstract 
social labor time claimed by workers in the form of the wage” (Foley, 
1982, 42; see also Mohun, 1994, 403). Although not all supporters of 
the New Solution explicitly draw the conclusion that this entails the 
rejection of the commodity nature of labor-power, we will see below 
that this is the necessary implication of this approach.
As mentioned above, this conception of the value of labor-power 
has been strongly criticized by other Marxist scholars. In our view, Mav-
roudeas’ (2001) critique stands out as probably the sharpest and most 
illuminating. According to this author, there are several shortcom-
ings in the New Solution approach. In the first place, this approach 
violently abstracts from the intermediate steps that lead from socially 
necessary labor for the reproduction of workers to the value of labor-
power. Specifically, it “discards the intermediation of a set of use-values 
(and their value) between necessary labor-time and money-wages and 
proceeds to link them directly” (Mavroudeas, 2001, 59). The upshot of 
this is that the “New Solution’s conception of the value of labor-power 
ends up with a Smithian labor-commanded conception of value rather 
than one based on abstract labor” (Mavroudeas, 2001, 59). In turn, 
this has the consequence of grounding the quantitative determination 
of the value of labor-power in extra-economic factors which, “when 
this is supplemented with the rejection of the commodity-nature of 
labor-power, then it can easily lead to a prioritization of power rela-
tions independently and almost prior to socio-economic relations” 
(Mavroudeas, 2001, 55). In effect, regardless of the New Solution’s 
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claim that in their conception the value of labor-power still represents 
a share of the total abstract labor performed, it is self-evident that a 
“value” that is not the objectification of the social determinations of the 
material production process of the commodity that acts as its “bearer,” 
can hardly be taken as synonymous with what Marx termed the “value 
of a commodity.” Thus, the New Solution’s eventual rejection of the 
commodity nature of labor-power is the other side of the same coin 
of their idiosyncratic conception of the determination of its value.
However, as Saad-Filho argues, despite the weaknesses of the New 
Solution, it is not easy to find a solid alternative within the Marxist 
literature (Saad-Filho, 2002, 48 ff). Most other contributions relapse 
into an equally problematic Ricardian or “labor-embodied” approach. 
At its most extreme, this perspective tends to assume an immediate 
identity between the value of labor-power and a “fixed” bundle of 
means of subsistence. But even in its more nuanced versions, this 
conception does not seem able to account for the determination of 
the composition of those “wage-goods,” their historical changes or the 
wage differential among different segments of the working class (Fine, 
1988, 180). Moreover, this Ricardian approach eventually ends up rei-
fying workers, as if they were “slaves, beasts of burden [or] machines” 
(Saad-Filho, 2002, 48) and, as a consequence, renders arbitrary the 
very concept of “exploitation” (Fine et al., 2002, 11).
In order to overcome the limitations of both the New Solution and 
neo-Ricardianism, Fine et al. come up with a third alternative whose 
main thrust is that “the value of labor power is neither a quantity of 
money nor goods but a quantity of value” which, in turn, is deter-
mined “at the aggregate level through the exchange between capital 
and labor as a whole (i.e., as social classes), prior to the process of 
production” (2002, 12). Now, although it is correct that the value of 
labor-power is already determined prior to the process of production 
which follows the capitalist’s purchase of that “peculiar commodity,” 
this analysis does not take us very far from a mere repetition of what 
Marx explicitly wrote in Capital. In other words, this position amounts 
to just asserting  the connection between the value of labor-power and 
the value of means of subsistence without demonstrating  it. No actual 
explanation of that relationship is offered other than the invocation 
of Marx’s texts. Maybe aware of this, these authors state that a proper 
full explanation of the value of labor-power needs to reconsider it 
at more complex levels of analysis. For instance, this requires the 
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dynamic redefinition of the bundle of wage-goods resulting from the 
development of the productive powers of labor. Indeed, the accumula-
tion of capital “tends both to redefine (lower) the value of labor power 
and (increase) the wage bundle” (Fine et al., 2002, 12). Furthermore, 
“consumption norms” vary greatly across the different categories of 
workers, so that it makes no sense to posit an “average” consumption 
bundle which would determine the value of labor-power “in general” 
(Fine et al., 2002, 12).
It seems to us that this alternative position does not succeed 
at fully overcoming the weaknesses of its opponents. First and 
foremost, these authors do not actually offer a clear and precise 
explanation of the determination of the value of labor-power “in 
general.” Instead, they just sidetrack the problem by invoking the 
need to incorporate more complex phenomena. Furthermore, 
methodologically speaking, it is quite simply incorrect to argue for 
the impossibility to fully resolve the question of the value of labor-
power “in general” given the complexity of its concrete forms of 
realization. It is not only possible but necessary to treat and settle 
the question at the level of the simpler or more abstract determina-
tions of capital.2 In fact, Marx himself made this methodological 
point in the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 when justifying the 
initial abstraction from the determinants of the value of labor-
power attributable to its complexity, since
important as the latter consideration becomes when it is a matter of analys-
ing the differing values of individual branches of labour, here it is irrelevant, 
for we are only concerned with the general relationship between capital 
and labour, and therefore have in view ordinary, average labour, seeing all 
labour as only a multiple of this average labour, the training costs of which 
are infinitesimally small. (Marx, 1988, 43.)
2 In this sense, the issue under discussion in this paper pertains to the “level of abstraction” of 
Volume I (i.e., to the social form of the process of production), and is analytically separable 
from the concrete forms assumed by the establishment of the unity of the movement of 
the total social capital in circulation (i.e., the “level of abstraction” of Volume III, including 
the so-called “transformation problem”). In other words, this is a problem pertaining to 
value-production and not to its distribution. However, one implication of our argument is clear 
in this regard. If one concludes that labor-power is a fully-fledged commodity and has a 
value determined “like any other commodity,” the value of variable capital does need to be 
transformed into the concrete form of price of production (a task which evidently exceeds 
the scope of this paper). As a consequence, we think that the alleged solution of the New 
Interpretation is no solution at all.
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In this sense, although otherwise writing from a similar perspective 
to the one just sketched out, Mavroudeas’ aforementioned contribu-
tion offers more elements both to explain the relationship between 
the value of means of subsistence and the value of labor-power, and to 
overcome the shortcomings of the New Solution approach. Regard-
ing the latter, this author rightly claims that commodity values must 
be explained by their content (i.e., by socially necessary labor-time 
required for their production) and not by their form (i.e., by the ratio 
in which they exchange against money in circulation). And although 
he admits that labor-power is a “peculiar” commodity (“since it only 
exists as a capacity of the living individual . . . which is commodified 
in capitalism”), he argues that it does not follow from this that it is 
“a natural good that enters the market without any value, acquiring 
there a price” (Mavroudeas, 2001, 56). Mavroudeas thereby proceeds 
to analyze the production process of labor-power and makes two addi-
tional points. First, he agrees with New Solution scholars like Mohun 
that no new value is added in the “domestic” sphere of reproduc-
tion of labor-power on the very same grounds: the reproduction of 
labor-power entails “human effort but this is not expended through 
a capitalist production process,” the upshot of which is that “there 
is no creation of new value or surplus-value and the sale of the com-
modity labor-power does not operate according to the rules of typical 
capitalist commodity exchange (obtaining an average rate of profit 
etc.)” (Mavroudeas, 2001, 56). Second, however, he also argues that 
the means of consumption required for the reproduction of labor-
power are capitalistically produced by wage-labor and bought in the 
market, which means that they have a value determined by socially 
necessary labor-time. Crucially, and here Mavroudeas goes beyond what 
Marx explicitly states in Capital, he further submits that the value of the 
means of “subsistence” is transferred  to labor-power through the work-
ers’ consumptive activity and therefore “this value has to be reflected 
in the price that is paid for buying labor-power (wage)” (Mavroudeas, 
2001, 56).
There are three problems with this defense of Marx’s argument 
on the value of labor-power. In the first place, it has no textual basis in 
Marx’s exposition in Capital; not because he explicitly states otherwise, 
but because he does not discuss the question at all. Presumably, Marx 
took for granted that in light of the determinations already unfolded 
by chapter 6, it would be self-evident for readers why “human effort” 
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expended in the domestic sphere could not be value-positing. As he 
unambiguously puts it in the section on commodity fetishism in chap-
ter 1, “objects of utility become commodities only because they are 
products of the labor of private individuals who work independently of 
each other” (Marx, 1976a, 165). This leads us to the second problem.
For while Mavroudeas is right to point out that no new value is 
posited in the domestic sphere of individual or personal consump-
tion, the grounds that he offers for that claim (which he shares with 
the New Solution) are essentially wrong. The expenditure of human 
labor-power within the domestic sphere does not create value not 
because it is not “expended through a capitalist production process 
with a view to obtaining the average rate of profit.” The reason lies 
in the fact that the organization of the allocation of that portion of 
social labor in its particular concrete forms which takes place within 
the “household” is not mediated through indirect social relations 
between private and independent  individuals (which, as argued else-
where (Kicillof and Starosta, 2007a; 2007b; Starosta, 2016), is the 
ground of value-positing activity). The allocation of social labor 
within the domestic sphere is organized through direct, personal rela-
tions (the family). In other words, that portion of social labor does 
not possess “the peculiar social character of the labor which produces 
[commodities]” (Marx, 1976a, 165).3
Finally, although we shall see that Mavroudeas’ point about the 
“transfer” of value from the means of consumption to the wage- 
worker’s labor-power is broadly on the right track, he does not offer 
a convincing explanation of why and how this material and social pro-
cess occurs.4 Note, however, that neither does Marx’s own presentation 
3 Of course, all products of capital are commodities, and only in the capitalist mode of 
production social wealth universally takes on the commodity-form. Yet, it does not follow 
that the value-form of social wealth is grounded in the fact that it is immediately ruled with 
a view to valorizing an individual capital. The simplest determination of the value-form is 
given at the level of abstraction of the commodity as a presupposition of capital. This is what 
grounds the content of the value-determination. By contrast, commodity production under 
the command of an individual capital with a view to obtaining the average rate of profit (i.e., 
the commodity not as a methodological–systematic premise but as result of the movement of 
capital) determines the concrete form  in which value is realized (i.e., the price of production). 
For a methodological discussion of the commodity as presupposition and result of capital, 
see Marx, 1976b, 953ff.
4 The reason given by Mavoudeas is that “contrarily to consumption goods consumed by 
capitalists (luxuries), workers’ consumption is a productive activity and they transfer their 
value to the commodified aspect of human reproduction (labor-power)” (Mavroudeas, 
2001, 56). At least on the basis of this statement alone, it is not clear to us in what sense the 
workers’ consumption is a productive activity.
328 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
in Chapter 6 of Capital  spell out, in any systematic fashion, the way 
in which the connection between the value of means of subsistence 
and the value of labor-power becomes concretely established over the 
course of the process of reproduction of the wage-worker. The link is 
just asserted. In order to make that connection explicit, we need to 
go beyond what Marx said on the question in Capital, albeit on the 
basis of determinations that are perfectly in line with his argument 
in the rest of the book.
The Value of Labor-Power
A first relevant element for this discussion can be found in the 
Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863. In that text, in the context of a 
critique of Bailey’s “silly” (sic) objection to Ricardo’s determination of 
the “value of labor,” Marx makes the point, not mentioned in Capital, 
that the determination of the value of labor-power by the value of the 
means of subsistence is not peculiar to that particular commodity but 
applies to all “organic” commodities; for instance, it applies to the 
value of animals as well (Marx, 1988, 48). Moreover, he makes clear 
that the way in which the means of subsistence enter in the “price of 
labor capacity” is through the “metabolic process,” i.e., through the 
“exchange of matter” involved in the process of individual consump-
tion of those means of subsistence by the bearer of human labor-power.
The price of cloth does indeed consist also of the price of the cotton yarn 
consumed in it, just as the price of labor capacity consists of the means of 
subsistence that enter into it through the metabolic process. Incidentally, 
the reproduction of living, organic things does not depend on the labor 
directly applied to them, the labor worked up in them, but on the means 
of subsistence they consume — and this is the way of reproducing them. 
Bailey could also have seen this in the determination of animals’ value; even 
in the case of machines, in so far as coal, oil and other matières instrumentales 
consumed by them enter into their cost. . . . Otherwise Bailey’s joke only has 
the upshot that the labor applied to the reproduction of the organic body is 
applied to its means of subsistence, not directly to the body itself, since the 
appropriation of these means of subsistence through consumption is not 
work but rather enjoyment. (Marx, 1988, 48.)
In other words, the “transfer” of the value of means of subsistence to 
the commodity labor-power takes place through the material change 
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of form of those use-values into the bodily (physical and intellectual) 
productive attributes of the wage-worker. Similarly to the transfer of 
the value of means of production to the final product, one could say 
that the value of means of subsistence, as Marx puts it, “undergoes a 
metempsychosis” (Marx, 1976a, 314). Through this “transmigration,” 
value “deserts the consumed body to occupy the newly created one” 
(Marx, 1976a, 314). The analogy, however, stops here.
For unlike means of production, labor-power is not, in and of 
itself, a use-value (Iñigo Carrera, 1995, 5).5 In other words, it is not 
in itself a means  for human life, “a thing that through its qualities sat-
isfies human needs of whatever kind” (Marx, 1976a, 125), although 
its existence is clearly a condition for the specifically human process 
of material metabolism. However, although human labor-power is 
not a use-value by its own material nature, it becomes form-determined as 
such when subsumed by capital as the active condition for its valorization. In 
effect, given the private form taken by social production, labor-power 
embodies the capacity to produce value and, more specifically, more 
value than it costs. (Surplus)value-positing for capital becomes its 
form-determined use-value.6 Thus, it is the constitution of the value-form 
into the alienated subject of social life that turns labor-power into a 
use-value, by determining the exercise of that human capacity as the 
immediate source of its self-expansion.
As Marx shows in Chapter 23 of Volume I on “Simple Reproduc-
tion,” the constitution of the total social capital into the subject of the 
movement of society reaches its plenitude when subsuming material 
reproduction in its unity, i.e., when it subordinates not only social pro-
duction and circulation, but also the process of individual consump-
tion (Marx, 1976a, 711ff). As a consequence, the unity of the human 
5 Note that transformation of the use-value of means of production into a new use-value is 
for Marx a necessary condition for the “transmigration” of their value to take place: “The 
reason why means of production do not lose their value at the same time as they lose their 
use-value is that they lose in the labor process the original form of their use-value only to 
assume in the product the form of a new use-value. But however important it may be to 
value to exist in, it is still a matter of complete indifference what particular object serves 
this purpose” (Marx, 1976a, 310).
6 This, we take it, is the meaning of the following passage from the original text of A Contribu-
tion to the Critique of Political Economy: “For money as capital, labor capacity is the immediate 
use value for which it has to exchange itself. In the simple circulation, the content of the 
use value was indifferent, dropped out of the economic determination of form. Here it 
is its essential economic moment. For the exchange value is determined as firmly established 
in exchange above all because it is exchanged with a use value confronting it in its own form 
determination” (Marx, 1987b, 504).
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metabolic process becomes inverted into a moment of the reproduc-
tion of capital. The implication of this is that in capitalist society the 
process of individual consumption does not bring each cycle of the 
process of metabolism to a close. In other words, in the capitalist 
mode of production individual consumption in the domestic sphere 
is not synonymous with final  consumption, as economics, both “clas-
sical” and “vulgar,” would have it (Ricardo, 1821, 339; Jevons, 1871, 
47; Keynes, 1936, 104). The latter moment is reached in the sphere 
where labor-power is consumed for the production of more value than 
its reproduction costs, i.e., in the phase of productive consumption or 
the labor process. This is crucial for the link between the privately 
undertaken socially necessary abstract labor-time materialized in the 
means of subsistence and the value of labor-power. Let us examine 
the matter more closely.7
The workers buy those means of consumption in order to repro-
duce their life as social subjects. In doing so, the value objectified in 
them is realized since the private labor that had been expended on 
them is confirmed as socially necessary. Those use-values are then 
taken to the domestic sphere of individual consumption, where they 
are either consumed straightaway if their materiality was immediately 
apt for the satisfaction of a human need, or subject to a further labor 
process. However, we have seen that in this latter case the objectifica-
tion of social labor does not result in its representation in the social 
form of value.
Now, when those use-values are consumed, their materiality does 
not simply vanish but only changes form into reconstituted labor-
power which, as argued above, is not in itself a use-value. Hence, if 
the immediate aim of the social reproduction process were the repro-
duction of human life (as would happen with a simple circulation 
of commodities), this transformation of the materiality of means of 
consumption into productive attributes of the human subject would 
bring this particular cycle of social reproduction to a close. Thus, 
even if those use-values had the commodity-form, their value would 
disappear definitively with that consumptive appropriation of their 
materiality.
However, we have further argued that from the point of view of 
the alienated organization of human life as an attribute of capital, that 
7 In what follows we draw on Iñigo Carrera, 1995, 6–7.
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process does not close the cycle of social reproduction, but is only a 
passing moment in the process of value’s self-valorization. Thus, the 
commodities consumed by the wage-worker must be turned into the 
production of his/her particular labor-power, that is, into the determi-
nate productive attributes that the material conditions for the valoriza-
tion of capital determine as a new use-value. Hence, from the general 
social point of view, the new form which those means of consumption 
acquire by being transformed in the renewed labor-power of the wage-
worker still needs to prove socially necessary, which in this context 
does not mean that it is capable of satisfying a human want, but that 
it is able to valorize capital. In other words, the confirmation that the 
portion of social labor originally allocated privately in the particular 
concrete form of those means of consumption was socially useful 
entails a further mediation, namely: the success of the wage laborer 
at selling his/her labor-power as a commodity, i.e., as a use-value that 
has been produced in a private and independent manner from the 
point of view of the form-determined content of the unity  of the social 
metabolic process. This is why the value borne by those means of subsistence 
does not disappear with their consumption in the household but reappears as 
the value of labor-power. If the latter is effectively sold, then the social 
labor expended in the production of the means of consumption which 
the worker had consumed to reproduce labor-power is eventually 
confirmed as socially useful.
Still, this does not yet bring the cycle of that commodity to an end. 
The realization of its use-value is still pending, a process that can only 
occur through its consumption. Therefore, only when the latter is 
effectively consumed (i.e., exploited) by capital in the immediate pro-
duction process as a specific use-value which is capable of producing 
surplus-value, that particular cycle of social reproduction is brought 
to a close. It is only at that stage that the use-value of labor-power 
(and so the changed form of the original means of consumption) 
suffers final appropriation and, with that, its value is eventually extin-
guished. On the other hand, that very consumption of labor-power 
by capital privately produces new commodities and hence, new value 
and surplus-value.
In sum, this discussion shows that there is a necessary material 
link between socially necessary labor-time expended in the produc-
tion of means of subsistence and the value of labor-power. Although 
the mediations that connect the value of means of subsistence with 
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the value of labor-power are not fleshed out by Marx, it is possible 
to establish that nexus in a way which is absolutely consistent with 
the general determinations of the value-form that he did present 
in Capital. In effect, we have shown that, with the proviso about the 
form-determined nature of its use-value, all the determinations of the 
commodity-form are present in the production of labor-power. Para-
phrasing Marx, a “definite quantity” of privately undertaken socially 
necessary abstract labor “is objectified in it.” That objectification of 
labor-time must therefore take on the value-form in order to manifest 
its general social character. The objections of critics to the commodity-
nature of labor-power are therefore unfounded.
In light of this conclusion, in the next couple of sections we turn 
to the discussion of two classic Marxist controversies that touched 
upon the production process of labor-power: the debates on “domestic 
labor” and on “skilled labor.” As we shall see, our approach to the 
reproduction of labor-power as commodity determined by the self-
valorization of capital will prove to be very valuable in shedding light 
on many of the contentious issues involved in those debates.
The Domestic Labor Debate
This debate was motivated by the perceived need to investigate 
more thoroughly the labor process performed within the wage- worker’s 
household (Benston, 1969; Morton, 1971). In the view of most of the 
participants, this task had not been undertaken satisfactorily within 
Marxism (Vogel, 2000, 156). Following on from Dalla Costa and James’ 
contribution (1972), the attention of many scholars subsequently 
turned to Marx’s argument about the quantitative determination of 
the value of labor-power. More specifically, several works made a case 
for the reconsideration of domestic labor as value-producing. Two 
different but converging arguments were put forward. In the first 
place, some authors argued that domestic labor is part of socially 
necessary labor for the production of labor-power and must therefore 
enter into the quantitative determination of its value and be reflected 
in the wage (Secombe, 1974). A second approach postulated that 
domestic labor is not immediately represented as the value of labor 
power, but indirectly as capital’s surplus value or profit. In its more 
sophisticated version, this perspective maintained that the surplus 
labor of the domestic worker is appropriated by capitalists through 
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the exchange of labor-power against a wage that does not pay for all 
the labor-time “objectified” in it (Harrison, 1973; Gardiner, 1976).
Various objections were raised against this broad “heterodox” per-
spective, the main one being that domestic labor is not subordinated to 
the law of value insofar as it is neither performed under capitalist rela-
tions of production (Himmelweit and Mohun, 1977), nor organized 
with a view to exchange (Smith, 1978). Hence, these critiques went 
on, concrete labor performed in the household cannot be reduced 
to socially necessary labor and therefore cannot be value-producing. 
In sum, these critics rejected the validity of the social identification of 
domestic and wage labor, which is precisely what the original contribu-
tions had assumed. Now, although we concur with these critics that it 
is incorrect to consider domestic labor as (surplus)value-producing, 
those original contributions had nonetheless the merit of providing 
an in-depth and detailed examination of the processes involved in 
the (re)production of labor-power. In some cases, those contributions 
even hinted at the aforementioned problem of the “transference” of 
the value of means of subsistence into the commodity labor-power. 
As a matter of fact, the pioneering work by Inman from the 1940s 
had already submitted that “the value of the commodities consumed 
by the worker’s family . . . reappear[s] again on the market, but in a 
new form, as the commodity labor-power” (Inman, 1942, 45, cited in 
Thomas, 1987, 331). As mentioned above, this insight is crucial for 
the determination of the value of labor-power by the socially neces-
sary labor objectified in the means of subsistence and, a fortiori, for 
the commodity-nature of labor-power.
Be that as it may, the point is that as a result of this debate, many 
Marxist scholars were led to question Marx’s overall argument regard-
ing the determination of the value of labor-power. Thus, Philip Harvey 
(1983, 308–310) suggested that if the value of means of subsistence 
reappears in the value of labor-power, this necessarily means that the 
workers’ individual consumption is in reality a labor process, which 
utilizes those means of subsistence as means of production of labor-
power. But if this is the case, Harvey continues, this “labor of produc-
tive consumption” must be considered as socially necessary for the 
production of labor-power. And the same goes for domestic labor that 
further transforms means of subsistence originally purchased as com-
modities with the wage. On these grounds, and in the face of the fact 
that Marx did not include these expenditures of human bodily powers 
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in the determination of the value of labor-power, Harvey concluded 
that Marx’s approach does not actually constitute a “labor theory” of 
the value of labor-power but a “cost of production theory” (P. Harvey, 
1983, 307, 312). In other words, the value of this “peculiar commodity” 
is not, pace Marx, determined “as in the case of every other commod-
ity” by the “labor-time necessary for the production . . . of this specific 
article” (Marx, 1976a, 274).8
From our perspective, these analyses reach these problematic 
conclusions because they overlook the essential determination at stake 
in the transference of value between different use-values, namely: 
the need to re-validate the social character of privately performed 
labor. This is a process that is generally mediated by productive labor 
but that, in the context of the overall movement of reproduction of 
the total social capital, takes place as well through individual con-
sumption. As argued at great length above, the abstract character of 
privately performed labor objectified as the value-form of means of 
subsistence does not attain definitive recognition as socially neces-
sary at the moment of their purchase by the working class family. 
This only occurs when the capitalist buys their labor-power with the 
aim of valorizing his/her capital and subsequently consumes them 
productively in the direct production process. Only at that point is 
the formal use-value of labor-power finally extinguished and its value 
therefore disappears. Hence, the reappearance of the value of means 
of subsistence as the value of labor-power simply expresses the need to 
reassert, under the new guise assumed by those use-values, the social 
character of the privately performed labor originally objectified in 
them. In other words, this “transfer of value” is quite simply derived 
from the general determination underlying the value-form of the 
product of labor: it is the reified form through which the immanent 
social determinations of human productive activity are represented 
when they are indirectly organized through the general production 
and exchange of commodities.
Why, then, is the labor performed in-between the wage-worker’s 
purchase of means of subsistence and the sale of labor-power not 
8 Some years later, Thomas (1987, 127) tried to avoid these conclusions by arguing that 
the only labor that transfers value is “commodity-producing, value-creating labor.” Hence, 
Marx’s argument needed to be amended in order to incorporate the fact that domestic 
labor produces value. In this way, she reinstated the feminist critique that considered Marx’s 
approach as incomplete (if not directly flawed).
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represented as its value? The answer to this question cannot just come 
down to saying, as in most critiques of the “heterodox” camp in the 
debate, that “domestic labor” is not subordinated to the “law of value.” 
As a matter of fact, this is precisely what needs to be explained. Thus, 
the reason  why this labor is not value-producing is that it is not private 
labor vis-à-vis the immediate consumer of its product. And note that this 
applies both  to reproductive labor undertaken by the worker him/
herself (which is not even social labor) and to work performed by 
other family members (which is social since it is done for another 
individual, i.e., the wage-worker, but directly so, i.e., its social character 
is organized through personal social relations). This point can be further 
clarified through a comparison with the domestic labor undertaken by 
a hired cleaner or cook. In the latter case, it does create value, since 
we do have an instance of privately performed social labor vis-à-vis 
the immediate consumer of its product, which thereby does take the 
commodity-form (as much as the labor that, for instance, produces 
the meals that the worker eats at a restaurant; the fact that the former 
occurs in the household is immaterial). As a consequence, the “domes-
tic labor” performed by a hired cleaner or cook does enter into the 
determination of the value of labor-power.9 Thus, the feminist norma-
tive claim that reproductive labor be considered as value-producing 
is revealed as underpinned by an essentially ahistorical or Ricardian 
conception of value, insofar as it considers that all productive expen-
diture of labor-power is value-producing regardless of its “peculiar 
social character” (Marx, 1976a, 165).
In sum, it is perfectly possible to explain the parts respectively 
played by the domestic productive and consumptive processes in the 
9 In this sense, it must be acknowledged that Marx’s presentation in Capital is not entirely 
satisfactory in this regard. Thus, he claims that labor-power has value like all other com-
modities because “it represents no more than a definite quantity of the average social 
labor objectified in it” (Marx, 1976a, 274). For the sake of rigor and clarity, he should have 
actually referred to “privately undertaken average social labor objectified in it.” In other 
words, only commodities (and not simply use-values) consumed by workers enter into the 
determination of the value of labor-power. In Marx’s defense, it was probably a shorthand 
expression which, even if not entirely correct, was seen by him as harmless in light of the 
rigorous and lengthy exposition of the determinations of the commodity-form contained 
in the first section of Capital (cf. his remark on overlooking the difference between value 
and exchange-value for the sake of brevity once the dialectical exposition has established 
their “unity and difference”). Besides, in the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 he made 
the point explicitly: in its general determination, “the means of subsistence needed for the 
maintenance or reproduction of labor capacity can all be reduced to commodities” (Marx, 
1988, 43).
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formation of the value of labor-power, on the basis of Marx’s “value-
form theory.” All privately undertaken socially-necessary labor for the 
production of this “peculiar commodity” is represented as its value, 
while all directly social necessary labor is not. Therefore, the critique 
of Marx’s analysis of the value of labor-power stemming from the 
“domestic labor debate” is ill-founded. The lack of conceptualization 
of this labor in the determination of value is not a “blind spot” of the 
Marxian critique of political economy (Werlhof, 1988). It is perfectly 
consistent with the “purely social objectivity” of the value-form that 
Marx discovered.
The Skilled Labor Debate
The question about the kind of labor expended to produce labor-
power and, more specifically, about its preservation or destruction in 
subsequent phases of capital’s overall circulation process has been at 
the center of another important controversy within Marxism, namely: 
the skilled labor debate. In this section, we review the main positions 
in the debate and offer some reflections on the way in which our 
reconsideration of the determinations of the commodity-nature of 
labor-power can shed light on many of the apparent difficulties posed 
by the “multiplied” value-producing powers of skilled labor.
The debate on skilled labor was initiated by Böhm-Bawerk’s well-
known criticism of Marx’s value-theory (Böhm-Bawerk, 1890; 1949). 
According to this author, the Marxian explanation of the equalization 
of qualitatively different labors fails because the argument unfolds “in 
a complete circle”: it starts out in search for an explanation of the 
exchange relation but, insofar as it is argued that “the standard of 
reduction [of skilled to simple labor] is determined solely by the actual 
exchange relations themselves,” it ends up accounting for the exchange 
relation on the basis of that very same exchange relation! (Böhm-
Bawerk, 1949, 83). The first line of reply provided by Marxists was 
that the greater value of the product of skilled labor is not explained 
by the exchange relation, but by the greater value of more complex 
labor-power. According to this conception, the higher the value of 
labor-power, the greater will be the magnitude of value that results 
from its objectification (Bernstein, 1900).
However, other Marxists very soon took this explanation to task 
for relapsing into a theory of value founded on “costs of production.” 
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As Hilferding noted, Bernstein’s explanation wanted “to deduce the 
value of the product from the ‘value of labor’” (Hilferding, 1949, 141). 
As an alternative, Hilferding and other authors proposed a procedure 
for the reduction of skilled to simple labor based on the addition of 
the quantities of simple labor that materialized in the production of 
skilled labor-power and which, indirectly, become “condensed” in 
the actual expenditure of the latter. More specifically, according to 
these authors these “formative labors” included both the work of the 
“technical educator” (Hilferding, 1949, 144) and that of the skilled 
laborer (in his/her capacity as student) (Bauer, 1906). Those past 
formative labors, Hilferding states, “are stored up in the person of the 
qualified laborer, and not until he begins to work are these formative 
labors made fluid on behalf of society” (Hilferding, 1949, 144).
Until the mid-1970s, the Hilferding–Bauer approach was widely 
accepted by Marxists as the definitive response to Böhm-Bawerk (e.g., 
Sweezy, 1942; Meek, 1956; Rowthorn, 1974). However, soon after that 
some Marxists started to raise some reservations against the alleged 
solution to the “reduction problem.” In the first place, it was argued 
that the Hilferding Bauer reduction procedure implied different rates 
of surplus value for skilled and simple labor which, it was claimed, 
contradicted the Marxist theory of exploitation (Morishima, 1973). 
Second, other scholars argued that in conceiving of the worker’s skills 
as the material condensation of past labor that would subsequently be 
represented in the higher value of the product, the productive attri-
butes of workers were treated as constant capital (Tortajada, 1977). In 
relation to the first of these objections, let us note that the existence 
of different rates of surplus value leaves the general qualitative deter-
mination underlying the exploitation of wage-workers untouched. In 
effect, regardless of the relative complexity of his/her labor-power, 
each worker performs (on average) as much labor for capital as the 
normal long-term reproduction of his/her labor-power allows. And 
he/she receives in exchange an equivalent of the socially necessary 
labor time for the reproduction of those productive attributes that 
capital demands from him/her. The fact that this might result in dif-
ferent rates of surplus value for labor-powers of different qualifications 
only affects the degree in which capital will appropriate unpaid surplus 
labor. But it does not compromise the validity of Marx’s explanation 
of the source of surplus value in the exploitation of the wage-worker. 
Furthermore, these varied rates of surplus value are immaterial for 
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the individual capital, insofar as it could be argued that this is but 
another differential condition of valorization that becomes averaged 
out through the formation of the general rate of profit (similarly to 
differences in the organic composition or turnover rates).
By contrast, the second objection does pinpoint a real flaw in 
the traditional “reduction method,” insofar as the latter involves a 
departure from the general determinations of value and surplus 
value. More specifically, it parts company with Marx’s argument 
that it is only the expenditure of the living labor of the worker that 
posits new value in the product, while the value of constant capital 
(i.e., “past labor”) is only “transferred” in the same magnitude. In 
postulating that the value of the product of skilled labor includes 
the “past labor” materialized in the more skilled labor-power, the 
classic solution ends up effectively conflating constant and variable 
capital. On this score, we concur with those who rejected the Hil-
ferding–Bauer train of thought.
In the face of these shortcomings of the traditional reduction 
procedure, new alternative solutions appeared that changed con-
siderably the very terms of the problem without, however, achieving 
any consensus. Thus, some scholars proposed that the reduction of 
skilled to simple labor should be regarded as a real and observable 
process of de-skilling of labor-power resulting from capital’s transfor-
mation of the labor process (D. Harvey, 1982; Itoh, 1987; Carchedi, 
1991), while others opted for considering skilled labor quite simply 
as more productive (P. Harvey, 1985; Bidet, 2007; Saad-Filho, 2002). 
In our view, rather than solving the “skilled labor” reduction prob-
lem, these alternative just sidestep it. By contrast, we think that our 
approach to the determination of the value of labor-power sketched 
out above offers a valuable and novel way to critically examine the 
classic Hilferding Bauer reduction procedure and to develop a more 
rigorous explanation of the “multiplied” value-creating powers of 
skilled labor.
In the first place, having demonstrated that labor-power is a fully-
fledged commodity we know with certainty that its value is exclusively 
determined by the privately performed socially necessary abstract 
labor required for its production. Moreover, insofar as capital’s pro-
ductive consumption of labor-power closes the form-determined cycle 
of social reproduction, this value disappears through the expendi-
ture of the worker’s living labor in the direct production process. 
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Consequently, regardless of the degree of complexity embodied in the 
worker’s labor-power, no single “atom” of its value can be preserved 
and transferred to the product of his/her labor. In this sense, the labor 
of the “technical educator” or the labor objectified in a textbook are 
hardly different from those labors objectified in the most prosaic of 
commodities that the worker consumes during his/her lunchtime. 
Assuming that they have the commodity-form, they are all part of the 
privately undertaken socially necessary labor required for the produc-
tion of the commodity labor-power and, in that condition, they are 
absolutely independent of the labor that the worker will perform when 
setting his/her labor-power into motion in the capitalist labor process.
Now, Hilferding–Bauer and their followers obviously think that 
their reduction procedure avoids Bernstein’s error of grounding the 
value of the product of skilled labor in the value of skilled labor-power. 
However, it seems to us that by including in the value of the product of 
skilled labor the socially necessary labors required for the production 
of skilled labor-power, they end up relapsing into a similar elementary 
mistake, namely: conflation of the value  of labor-power (the “past 
labor” objectified in it) and its use-value (the value-positing capacity 
of living labor in action). As stated above, there can be no trace of 
the past labor required for the production of skilled labor-power 
in the “multiplied” value-positing powers of skilled living  labor in 
action. The central question still stands unanswered: how is the 
higher value of the product of skilled labor explained?
Again, here we think that the answer must be: “as in the case of any 
other commodity,” i.e., by the privately performed socially necessary 
abstract labor required for its production. The key, of course, resides 
in being absolutely clear and precise about which private labors are 
socially necessary just for the production of the product of skilled labor. 
And these come down to the living labor of the skilled worker, the 
“dead” labor objectified in the means of production consumed by liv-
ing labor in the capitalist production process and, crucially, the labor 
expended by the skilled laborer himself/herself (i.e., not by the “technical 
educator”) with a view to acquiring the skills that are socially necessary 
for the production of the said commodity. As we have seen, the latter is a 
kind of labor which, insofar as it is not private from the point of view 
of the production of (skilled) labor-power, does not enter into the 
determination of its value. However, it definitely is private and socially 
necessary from the perspective of the production of the use-value that 
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the skilled laborer will produce under the command of the capitalist. 
For that reason, it enters into the value of the product of skilled labor.
Clearly, this admittedly succinct answer does not address all the 
complexities and subtleties involved in the debate over the reduction 
of skilled to simple labor, a task which exceeds the scope of this sec-
tion.10 However, this discussion should suffice to shed light on the gist 
of the solution to this long-standing difficulty in Marxist value theory: 
the rigorous identification of the opening and closing phases of each 
capital-determined cycle of social production and consumption and, 
as a consequence, of the exact amount of privately performed socially 
necessary abstract labor that is required for the production of each 
particular commodity.
Conclusion
This article has critically examined the rejection of the commod-
ity-nature of labor-power based on the broad argument that it is not 
produced under the direct command of capital. Although its lineage 
can be traced back to the early 20th century, this long-standing argu-
ment gained new life recently in association with the so-called New 
Solution approach to the transformation problem. This perspective 
has encountered some valid critical reactions which, however, have 
not offered a solid and conclusive alternative. In light of this, we 
took up the challenge and attempted to develop an explanation of 
the fully-fledged commodity-character of labor-power on the basis of 
Marx’s own analysis of the value-form but beyond what he explicitly 
stated in Capital.
In a nutshell, our contribution revolved around the clear identi-
fication and differentiation of the specific social character of all the 
labor involved in the production of labor-power, from the point of view 
of the reproduction of the total social capital. It is the latter which, as the 
10 One of the issues not addressed in this paper is the consistency of the different solutions 
with the scarce number of quotes by Marx that treat the subject of skilled labor. For instance, 
in one highly controversial passage Marx states that the respective rates of surplus value 
of skilled and simple labor are equal (Marx, 1981, 241). From our perspective, Marx was 
probably assuming that the use-values needed for the daily reproduction of each type of 
labor-power are identical, so that if the skilled laborer expends a working day at home to 
acquire the skills, the subsequent expenditure of skilled labor-power will objectify twice the 
amount of value. But since his/her labor-power will have cost twice, the rate of surplus value 
will remain the same.
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general social relation presiding over the movement of present-day 
society, gives unity and content to the human life-process. The cru-
cial upshot of this for the purpose of grasping the commodity-nature 
of labor-power was two-fold. First, only privately undertaken social 
labor can form the value of labor-power. Second, when subsumed 
under the overall movement of the total social capital’s reproduction, 
the privately performed labor required for labor-power’s production 
attains final validation of its social usefulness only when it is exploited 
by capital in the direct process of production. This was the key link 
to explain the reappearance of the value of means of subsistence as 
the value of labor-power. On these grounds, we were able to reach 
the same conclusion that Marx reaches in Chapter 6 of Volume I of 
Capital, namely, that the value of labor-power is determined, just “as 
in the case of every other commodity,” by the (privately performed) 
socially necessary labor for its production. However, unlike Marx’s 
unmediated assertion, we unfolded all the mediations that are neces-
sary to validate that claim.
As we have seen, this approach to the value of labor-power not only 
offers a way of grounding one of the fundamental categories of the 
critique of political economy. In addition, it provides useful tools to 
overcome the impasse reached within two classic Marxist controversies 
that have an intimate connection with the social processes under lying 
the production of labor-power and its form-determinations as a com-
modity, both as a value and as a use-value : the debate on domestic labor 
and the debate on skilled labor. Regarding the former, we have seen 
that our approach can shed light on the only reason why domestic 
labor is not value-producing. Briefly put, it is a part of social labor that 
is organized through direct personal relations, i.e., that is not privately 
performed vis-à-vis the consumer of its product. As for skilled labor, 
we showed that the only way to be consistent with its definition while 
avoiding the confusion between the value and the use-value of skilled 
labor-power, is to grasp that only the “formative labor” undertaken 
by the wage-laborer himself/herself is private vis-à-vis  the final con-
sumer of the commodity that he/she will eventually produce under 
the command of capital. For this reason, only this privately performed 
socially necessary labor must be added to the productive living labor 
of the skilled worker in order to determine the value of its product. 
In sum, we have seen that in both the case of domestic labor and 
that of skilled labor, the key to resolve the issues that gave rise to the 
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respective debates, consists in the clear understanding of the part that 
they play in the overall cycle of valorization of capital.
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